Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page

Asynchronous Games over Tree Architectures

We consider the task of controlling in a distributed way a Zielonka asynchronous automaton. Every process of a controller has access to its causal past to determine the next set of actions it proposes to play. An action can be played only if every process controlling this action proposes to play it. We consider reachability objectives: every process should reach its set of final states. We show that this control problem is decidable for tree architectures, where every process can communicate with its parent, its children, and with the environment. The complexity of our algorithm is l-fold exponential with l being the height of the tree representing the architecture. We show that this is unavoidable by showing that even for three processes the problem is EXPTIME-complete, and that it is non-elementary in general

EMG/ENG services rendered by clinical neurophysiology technologists in solo practice

CITATION: Bill, P. L. A., et al. 1998. EMG/ENG services rendered by clinical neurophysiology technologists in solo practice. South African Medical Journal, 88(11):1360.The original publication is available at http://www.samj.org.za[No abstract available]Publisher’s versio